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‘Tour de Psycho’: Sociopathy and doping in sports. 
Introduction 
When, in 2013, the erstwhile invincible king of cycling, Lance Armstrong, confessed to 
doping, the sporting world was gripped by a sense of shock. Commentary invited us to 
ponder on the meaning of this ‘fall from grace’ in which a publicly revered figure had 
proven, yet again, that ‘all was not well’ in athletics. And yet, apropos of Armstrong’s 
revelation on ‘Oprah,i there was a sense of ‘where there is smoke there is fire’: Hadn’t 
previous investigations- denied by Armstrong, of course- including that the World Anti-
Doping Agency (WADA), after arrived at a similar conclusion? Wasn’t the evidence ‘there 
for us to see’- in the sworn affidavits of former teammates, or in the avalanche of 
lawsuits (culminating in out-of-court settlements) that his network of attorneys 
mounted against the international sports media? The purpose of this article is to engage 
with this ‘smoke’, this ‘writing on the wall’, which hangs menacingly in front of our view 
every time there is revelation of doping in sports. Deploying the notion of sociopathy, 
hitherto the staple of the standard corporate crime narrative (see, for example, Pech & 
Slade, 2007; Akhtar et al., 2012; Croall, 2012), we reveal how sociopathy is embedded in 
everyday pursuit of success and how the standard ‘success’ legend overlaps with 
criminality, and by extension staging the hypocrisy of the collectivity which was, for 
example, ‘shocked’ by Armstrong’s revelation: The reader should expect to encounter 
the ‘other Armstrong’- the one willing to push the envelope as long as s/he is not 
caught- in all of us!  
The debate adopts the following structure: First, we justify the deployment of the 
concept of sociopathy; what is in it for us, the criminologists? What can such 
deployment contribute in terms of insight? This is followed by a definition of the notion 
of doping, including the different things that accompany this road to ruin- for those who 
are caught, at least, or success for others who aren’t.  The logic staged here is picked in 
the section after that which looks at the usage of sociopathy, as distinct from 
psychopathy for instance, and its practical deployment in recent research. A detour is 
deliberately made here so the reader can see other sociopaths (in the food industry, in 
popular media, banking and so forth. The discussion then returns to illustrate the 
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sociopathy surrounding cycling (Armstrong) and athletics (in Russia and Kenya), 
thereafter drawing a conclusion on the impact of this conceptual tour. 
Let us begin the debate, appropriately I think, with the standard sociopath’s question:  
What is ‘in it’ for me (the criminologist)? 
Two things: First of all, there is discernible dearth of criminological literature on 
sociopathy outside the traditional (corporate) scope of large, multilevel, financial 
organisations. There is surprisingly little criminological focus on sports crime, despite 
the widespread con in the last 30 years (from Ben Johnson’s doping in the 1988 Soul 
Olympics, all the way to the recent disgrace of American sprinters Marion Jones and 
Justin Gaitlin- and the present stand-off between the World Anti-Doping Agencyii, 
WADA, and a number of countries ahead of the 2016 summer Olympics in Rio). There 
has been little examination, in nuce, of how we, as a society, are affected by the 
seemingly ‘harmless’ sociopaths who populate the tributaries of the media and sports 
industry. There is even less interdisplinary readings of the public’s (you and me) role in 
the construction and legitimation of the success narrative on which most sociopathy 
(which we define shortly) rides. (As part of this exploration we shall therefore be 
claiming that, although the role of individual sociopaths is definitive in criminal 
enterprises, the impact of what Punch (20002) refers to as ‘suite violence’ would be 
diminished, were it to be severed from the wider (socio-economic and political) veins 
which feed it.: At the macro-level, these wider veins include the public attachment to 
capitalist success stories- from messiah figures, to heroes, to ‘come-back kids’ who 
succeeded against all odds (See also Boddy, 2011; Punch, 2000.))  
Our conviction, secondly, is that only interdisciplinarity can offer the badly needed 
critique of the rhizomes of sports doping. We bring, apropos of the milieu of sociopathy 
and sociopaths, the surgical tools of Organisational culture analysis (for example, 
Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; Lippens, 2001; Lippens and Van Calster, 2004; Glasbeek, 
2002), Psychology (for example, Lykken, 1996; Bakan, 2008; Huston, 2013; Easton, 
1991; Pech and Slade, 2007) and Criminology (for example, Slapper and Tombs, 1999; 
Croall, 2001; 2012; Gobert, 2008; Braithwaite, 2000; 2013). The point here is that, 
although criminological attention is shifting to so-called ‘victimless crimes’ (for 
example, Pech & Slade, 2007; Akhtar et al. 2012) contemporary analyses of sociopathy 
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(mostly in organisational behaviour literature) limit their purview to occupations such 
as banking, law or stock brokerage- perhaps because of the inherent conditions 
allegedly favourable to sociopathy within these career paths (Thomas, 2013; Bakan, 
2005; Boddy, 2011). Nonetheless, while we broadly agree with past research which has 
demonstrated that all corporations (size notwithstanding) culturally nurture 
sociopathic tendencies amongst their successful players (Pech & Slade, 2007; Boddy, 
2013, Basham, 2011), we claim that the contours of recent ‘sociopathy’ discourse 
(wedded too much to ‘Wall street’ and ‘serial killings’) are not just too limited, but are 
also too limiting: There is scope to breach these limiting gulags by examining the toxic 
encounter of sociopathiciii culture (in organizational analysis) with ‘poor institutional 
oversight’ (White collar criminology) and what others- for example O’doherty et al. 
(2011); Bakan (2005)- have referred to as the ‘white spaces’ of capitalism (cultural 
criminology)iv. But, first things first: 
Doping: A ‘tour de facts’: 
Public commentary has widely been preoccupied with the notion of doping in sports-
but what exactly is it? Higgins (2013) apropos of Clarke (1962) defines doping as 
athletes taking illegal substances to improve their performances. Such illegal substances 
have been categorized by WADA into five classesv, the most common of which are 
stimulants and hormones (which besides being illegal also carry additional health risks 
and, as such, are also banned by wider sports' governing bodies). According to the UK 
Anti-Doping Agency (UKadvi), substances and methods become illegal (and are 
therefore banned) when they meet at least two of the three-point criteria: (1) when 
they enhance performance, or (2) pose a threat to athlete health, or (3) violate ‘the 
spirit of sport’. There is no space to unpack these conceptualisations at length, but 
suffice to note that the most commonly (ab)used substances are so-called ‘androgenic 
agents’, the most popular of which are (anabolic) steroids. Anabolic steroids, usually 
taken either in tablet form or injected into muscles or applied to the skin in creams or 
gels, came into the purview of anti-doping bodies precisely because of their 
enhancement power; for example enabling athletes to train harder, to recover more 
quickly from injury and ‘burn-out’ or to build more muscle. (The gym ‘fanatic’ comes to 
mind here). But, there is a flip side to this enhancement power too: Excess (ab)use could 
lead to kidney damage and increased aggression (Buckley et al. 1988; Irving et al. 2002). 
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(Other side-effects include baldness and low sperm count for men, and increased facial 
hair and deepened voices for women.) Then there are ‘stimulants’, which make athletes 
more alert and can overcome the effects of fatigue by increasing heart-rate and blood 
flow. But they are addictive too, and, in extreme cases, can lead to heart failure (Hsu et 
al. 2006; Ghafery, 1995). Other drugs which have become prominent over the years 
include ‘Diuretics’ and ‘masking agents’, which are used to remove fluid from the body- 
and thus are deployed when the need to hide other drug use arises or, in sports such as 
boxing and horse racing, to help competitors "make the weight" (Sonksen, 2001). There 
are others such as ‘Narcotic analgesics’ and ‘cannabinoids’ which are used to mask the 
pain caused by injury or fatigue - but in practice can make injuries worse, or become 
addictive- with products such as morphine and oxycodone (banned, although its opiate-
derived painkiller codeine is allowed). Then there are ‘peptide hormones’- substances 
such as EPO (erythropoietin) and HGH (human growth hormone) - which increase bulk, 
strength and red blood cell count and give athletes more energyvii. 
Nevertheless, the use of stimulants and strength-building substances in sport is not a 
new phenomenon as Higgins (2013) apropos of Clarke (1962) argues: The received 
wisdom is that use of substances goes as far back as Ancient Greece. Case in point: In the 
1904 Olympics, marathon runner Thomas Hicks used a mixture of brandy and 
strychnine and nearly died (Bamberger and Yaeger, 1997; Sonksen, 2001). As Wadler et 
al (1989) point out, it was not only uncommon for athletes during this period to use 
mixtures of strychnine, heroin, cocaine, and caffeine – sometimes with individuals 
deploying their secret formulae, to outcompete their field, but this was also common 
practice until heroin and cocaine became available only by prescription in the 1920s. 
After this ban, amphetamines replaced strychnine as the stimulant of choice for athletes 
in the 1930s (Kutcher et al, 2002) while, in the 1950s, the Soviet Olympic team first 
used male hormones to increase strength and power (Wadler et al, 1989). (There were 
even elements of what, below, we refer to as ‘organizational sociopathy’; for example 
the well-documented, meticulous and controlled hormonal doping experiments on 
adolescent athletes by the East German administration, which only became known after 
the collapse of the Berlin Wall, as Franke and Berendonk (1997) also claim.)  
Nonetheless, it was during the 1920s that the idea of restricting drug use in sport gained 
traction. In 1928 the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) - athletics' 
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world governing body - became the first international sports federation to ban doping 
(Higgins, 2013). In 1966 Union Cycleste Internationale (UCI)viii, the world governing 
body for cycling, and Federation Internationale de Football (FIFA), were the first to 
introduce doping tests in their respective world championships, with the first Olympic 
testing coming in 1968, at the Winter Games in Grenoble and Summer Games in Mexico. 
By the 1970s, most international federations had introduced drug-testing. (The 
standard ‘test’ involves taking blood and urine samples, or both, from athletes. Most 
testing for doping products uses a long-established technique called mass spectrometry, 
which involves firing a beam of electrons at urine samples to ionise them - turning the 
atoms into charged particles by adding or removing electrons. Scientists claim that 
substance samples contain unique "fingerprints" so that it is possible to link a positive 
test to an individual within a very small margin of error.ix The tests are not fool-proof 
however: Some by-products of doping substances are so small they may not produce a 
strong enough signal for detection. Blood testing is capable of detecting EPOx and 
synthetic oxygen carriers, but not blood transfusions. One method introduced to aid the 
detection of such transfusion is the ‘Biological Passport’ brought in by WADA in 2009, 
the passport aims to reveal the effects of doping rather than detect the substance or 
method itself. It is an electronic document about an athlete that contains certain 
markers from throughout their career. If these change dramatically, it alerts officials 
that the athlete might be doping. Some scientists have questioned the passport's 
efficiency - especially when complicating factors such as training at altitude are factored 
in - but also its sensitivity to micro-dosing, a little-but-often approach to doping 
(Committee on Sports and Doping, 2005; WADA, 2006). 
In recent years- and perhaps as a result of the aforementioned factors- sports events 
have been characterised by one or other revelations of substance-enhanced cheating in 
the wake of systematic doping tests. In that sense, although the widely publicized 
revelation of doping by the retired American cyclist Lance Armstrong has become the 
emblem of doping in sports, this is an on-going matter: In December 2015, for example, 
a German TV document alleged that many as 99% of Russian athletes were guilty of 
doping, although the Russian Athletics Federation described the allegations as "lies"xi. 
Prior to Armstrong's confession, Ben Johnson was probably the world's highest-profile 
drugs cheat. The Canadian sprinter tested positive for anabolic steroids at the 1988 
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Olympic Games in Seoul, just after winning the 100m in a world record of 9.79 seconds 
(which he was subsequently stripped of). Similarly, the British sprinter Dwain 
Chambers was banned for 2 years in 2004 after being found guilty of taking the anabolic 
steroid THG, while compatriot Linford Christie, a former sprint champion, was 
suspended form athletics altogether after failing a drugs test. In all such cases the 
outcome has been determined by the criteria- or window- set out by sports governing 
bodies, and the choices that athletes make in light of this knowdge. As an example, 
although the UCI - cycling's world governing body- has introduced a 24-hour testing 
window in 2016, its effectiveness will hinge on not only regulatory acumen, but also the 
choices athletes make in light of the weaknesses of this framework. As an example, 
previously there was no testing between 11pm and 6am- providing a potential window 
of opportunity for micro-dosing products, such as EPO, without being caught- but it may 
also be doping cheats will invent around ever-stricter criteria. The point: Violation of 
strict sports protocols is not merely down to how stricter they become, or are put into 
effect; it is also an aspect of the thing we turn to, next:  
Sociopathy and crime 
In popular culture, sociopathy and psychopathy are commonly used interchangeably, 
often distinguished by skewed definitions. As others (Lykken, 1996; 2006; Hall and 
Benning, 2006; Boddy et al. 2010, for example) argue, this is often due to a presumption 
that psychopathy is attributable to violent, murderous behaviour- while sociopathy is 
its non-violent, ‘diet’ version. The standard definition of psychopathy as  ‘a personality 
disorder’ emphasizes ‘enduring antisocial behaviour’, ‘diminished empathy’, ‘ lack of 
remorse’, and ‘disinhibited or bold behaviour’ as the hallmarks of the psychopathxii. On 
the other hand, since its coinage by the German psychiatrist Karl Birnbaum in 1930, 
sociopathy has been used as an alternative to the concept of psychopathyxiii, with this 
alternative deployment emphasizing the inclination to violate social norms. Patrick 
(2005) and Rutter (2007), for example, base their distinction of psychopathy from 
sociopathy on the former’s biological causation, and in tandem with Hare (1999) who 
(usefully for our purposes) claims that the dominant usage of sociopathy over 
psychopathy is not one of etymological distinction but mere preference: Sociopathy is, 
as we also agree, preferred by analyses emphatic on social factors and early 
environment, while psychopathy is the province of psychological, biological, and genetic 
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(although sometimes in addition to environmental) factors. Our emphasis on the social 
milieu of sociopathy should not be taken as conclusive resolution of any conceptual 
lacuna between the two: On the contrary, it merely allows us to show our hand- and also 
because space does not allow a lengthy and detailed analysis of the concepts, much less 
the implication of their practical deployment. A similar path has been taken by Kailemia 
(2016) in that analysis of his which engages with ‘sociopathy in the EU food industry’, 
and also by Boddy et al.’s (2010) analyses of corporate ethics. In both accounts the 
underlying logic is preference. 
The usage of sociopathy as an analytical framework outside the corporation is thus 
gaining traction: Kailemia (2016) (apropos of Lippens, 2000 and Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987) compares the network of sociopathy responsible for the 2013 EU Horse Meat 
Scandalxiv to a rhizome of complex, messy, multi-directional network of dealers at 
various levels: (1) Animal farmers and breeders (from the bigger, more commercially 
successful, who slaughter their own livestock and sell the meat to the smaller ones who 
transport their animals for slaughter to abattoirs); (2) companies that separate the 
different cuts of meat from the animal and process the rest of it; processors (including 
those who buy processed meat from other meat processors, but also mix it with meat 
from multiple suppliers or their own products); (3) Suppliers (who may also be 
processers) of different grades of processed m at to their buyers; (4) ready-meals 
producers (such as factories which usually  purchase frozen mince blocks but also make 
ready meals and other meat products like mince, burgers, instant lasagne, bottled meat 
sauce, meat stock, pies and sausages).  
The idea of a rhizome has parallels with recent analyses of doping in sports, which we 
turn to shortly, but briefly, its main power is in erasing the c ear delineation of 
‘perpetrators from victims’, suppliers from consumers’ or ‘processors from distributors’ 
and so on, so that, in the case of the meat scandal:  
There is a more sinister motive to this arrangement…: To eliminate all possibility 
of product traceabilityxv, capitalising on legal loopholes... Traceability is more 
complex when corporate activity is transnational or cross-Sectoral, as is the case 
with the EU meat rhizomes. Here, multiplicity of supply and processing 
diminishes the traceability/audit trail between the farm and consumer, 
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sometimes even when the routes taken are relatively short and few (Kailemia, 
2016: 74). 
You could substitute the beef (horse?) cuts with the illegal drugs and still retain the 
same logic of evasion: The power of sociopathy lies in deliberate development of 
rhizomes of evasion which allow cheating to remain in sight but invisiblexvi. But, these 
rhizomes would be ineffective were it not for the presence of individuals and 
organizations that are willing to go as far as it takes to develop and sustain their 
operation. In the case of the case of the Horse Meat Scandal, one Lawrence McAllister, 
proprietor of the Red Lion Abattoir, slaughtered and sold sickly horses infected with 
Bute- a dangerous chemical- in his abattoirs where  
Polish migrant workers… were often offered huge bonuses- paid in cash to avoid 
audit trails- for working in the middle of the night defrosting frozen meat, up to a 
year old and sometimes rotten. The workers would grind up this old meat with 
horse meat and newer beef, only to repack it as fresh beef for sale.  
How about the infamous Armstrong, who has become the face of doping? Does the 
outline of a sociopath apply to him? 
‘How we did it in Texas’! 
The legend of Lance Armstrong has been with us for some time: He started his athletic 
career at the age of 12, first as a swimmer and subsequently as a Triathlete, winning the 
‘Iron Kids Triathlon’ at age 13xvii. He showed remarkable prowessxviii, turning pro at 16 
and becoming the number-one triathlete in the 19-and-under group (and along the way 
meeting Chann McRae, who became a US Postal Service cycling teammate and the 2002 
USPRO national champion). When the Motorola Cycling Team signed him up in 1992 
Armstrong won 10 one-day events and stage races, with the breakthrough victory 
coming in the UCI Road World Championship held in Norway. This, itself, came in the 
heels of Tour de France win, in the stage from Châlons-sur-Marne to Verdun. But, even 
at this early stage, he had shown penchant for violating the rules of the game: For 
example, despite winning, in quick succession, the Thrift Drug Triple Crown of Cycling, 
the Thrift Drug Classic in Pittsburgh, the K-Mart West Virginia Classic, and the CoreStates 
USPRO national championship in Philadelphia, he has been alleged by another cyclist 
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competing with in the CoreStates Road Race to have bribed that cyclist so that he would 
not compete with Armstrong for the win. Despite these career highs Armstrong’s 
narrative has been dominated by his revelation of doping which may be summarised by 
the USADA dossier thusxix: 
• The achievements of USPS/Discovery Channel pro cycling team, of which 
Armstrong was part of, were, according to the United States Anti-Doping Agency 
(USADA), accomplished through the most sophisticated, professional and 
successful doping programme that sport has ever seen.  
• Engagement in ‘serial cheating" with a career fuelled ‘from start to finish’ by 
doping.  
• Confirmation by more than a dozen former team-mates, friends and former team 
employees of fraudulent course of conduct.  
• The existence of a network of ‘small army of enablers’, including doping doctors, 
drug smugglers and others within and outside the sport and his team.  
• The exercise of ultimate control over not only his own personal drug use but 
over the doping culture of the team.  
• Deployment of a team of enablers who could predict when testers would turn up 
and seemed to have inside information.  
As Armstrong himself confessed, although he acted ‘on personal volition’, he 
nonetheless relied on a network of enablers whose task it was to corrupt its way 
through doctors to masseurs to product developers, test-administrators and so on. He 
told Oprah of a network which was 
Definitely professional and it was definitely smart, if you can call it that, but it was 
very conservative, very risk-averse, and very aware of what matteredxx.  
In this exposé he also shows predisposition to the matter thus;  
I don't want to accuse anybody else. I don't want to talk about anybody else. I 
made my decisions. They are my mistakes…. The culture was what it was... I 
viewed it as very simple. There were things that were oxygen-supplying drugs 
that were beneficial for cycling. My cocktail was EPO, but not a lot, transfusions 
and testosterone. I was the leader of the team and the leader leads by example. 
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There was never a direct order. That never happened. We were all grown men 
and made our choices. There were team-mates who didn't dopexxi. 
And, notice how he rationalizes the risk of being caught: 
No. Testing has evolved. Back then they didn't come to your house and there was 
no testing out of competition and for most of my career there wasn't that much 
out-of-competition testing so you're not going to get caught because you clean up 
for the races… It's a question of scheduling. That sounds weird. I'm no fan of the 
UCI but the introduction of the biological passport [in 2008] worked… I'm paying 
the price and I deserve this. That's okay. I deserve it… My ruthless desire to win 
at all costs served me well on the bike but the level it went to, for whatever 
reason, is a flaw. That desire, that attitude, that arrogance. Yes, I was a bully. I 
was a bully in the sense that I tried to control the narrative and if I didn't like 
what someone said I turned on them… It was winning at all costs. When I was 
diagnosed (with cancer) I would do anything to survive. I took that attitude - win 
at all costs - to cyclingxxii.  
There is sufficient here to offer a tautological analysis of sociopathy- I mean, from the 
perspective of someone who not only justifies winning at all costs but also links it to a 
tragedy (of cancer), which has appeal across a wide spectrum of listeners. It is even 
more tempting when you consider that, prior to his revelation on Oprah, Armstrong had 
taken every step to silence anyone who came up with these specific allegations, 
including high profile legal suites against media houses, individual journalists and 
former team mates.  But then, as he told Oprah,  
I kept hearing I'm a drug cheat, I'm a cheat, and I’m a cheater. I went in and just 
looked up the definition of cheat and the definition of cheat is to gain an 
advantage on a rival or foe that they don't have. I didn't view it that way. I viewed 
it as a level playing field." 
Let us, by way of analysis, reconsider sociopathy 
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From meat adulteration to doping in sports; the role of sociopathy 
The narratives of sports cheats, such as Armstrong, and food adulterers allude to a 
‘sociopathic personality’ which Lykken (2006) describes as involving egocentricity, lack 
of remorse and denial. This personality, Lykken argues, rides on ‘incomplete 
manifestation of disorder’; that is, moderate deployment of the sociopath character 
mostly to avoid detection and/or criminal prosecution or conviction. Among other 
exhibitors of these personalities, Lykken includes prominent businessmen, physicians 
and religious figures. There is parallel here with the figure who, on the one hand, 
deploys a small army of corruptors, but on the other hand, is also a respected cultural 
icon, an achiever and family figure. (Armstrong actually confessed to Oprah that he 
‘came out’ after the anguish of seeing his son defending his record in front of his 
peers)xxiii.  
The point not to be missed is that, while the individual cheat is important, we should not 
lose sight of the fact that sociopathy – as ‘moderated disorder’ (Lykken, 2006)- succeeds 
by precisely embedding itself onto the narrative of societal accomplishment, even 
becoming its defining element (see also Bakan, 2005). Armstrong appears to vindicate 
Hall and Benning’s (2006: 459) argument that ‘certain psychopathic traits might in fact 
serve as valuable personal assets in some professions, such as law, politics or business’: 
Success in these career paths, in nuce, rides (pardon the pun) on a sociopathy ‘checklist’ 
which includes: Superficial charm; a grandiose sense of self-worth; pathological lying; 
manipulation; lack of remorse about harming others; lack of emotional depth; cold 
calculation and lack of empathy for ‘losers’, and; denial of responsibility. Armstrong’s 
widely analysed life, or even the sit-down with Oprah, appears to embrace this 
checklist: He was a pathological liar, denying any use of performance-enhancing drugs 
on camera and in sworn affidavits- even accusing USADA of spiking his urine with drugs 
so he could fail tests (in the case investigated by UCI, discussed below)xxiv. He went 
further than this and manipulated drugs results employing a complex network of 
enablers who could warn him of impending tests, sometimes having dope flown on 
private jet into practice sessions in Europexxv. As for his sense of self-worth, analysis 
would be merely ‘academic’.  
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Armstrong is also the stuff of popular culture: While many Wall Street traders crumble 
under their losses, the wolf of Wall Street brushes off failure and starts afresh the next 
day (Belfort, 2007). Or, where average people would shudder, the ‘Navy Seal’ sniper 
calmly squeezes the trigger (Huston, 2013) et cetera. And, true to character, recent 
literature (for example, Bashan, 2011 and Hall and Benning, 2006) has correctly 
predicted the inevitable rise of sociopaths in the business or military world: The 
sociopath is more likely to be the chief executive of a corporation than to be the person 
sweeping the floors. Look at the parallel: In the July 2005 issue of Outside magazine, 
Armstrong hinted at running for governor. Armstrong and former president George W. 
Bush, a Republican and fellow Texan, even called themselves friends so that Bush even 
called Armstrong in France to congratulate him after his 2005 Tour De France victory. 
(In August of that year, The Times reported that the President had invited Armstrong to 
his Prairie Chapel Ranch to go mountain biking). Armstrong even created a YouTube 
video in 2007 with former President George H. W. Bush to successfully pass Proposition 
15, a US$3 billion taxpayer bond initiative which created the Cancer Prevention and 
Research Institute of Texas. 
What about the networks? 
In the wider context available literature on corporate crime and organisational deviance 
(especially in investment banking and the petrochemical industry) has revealed how 
sociopathy is nurtured by rhizomic networks which delink the decision-maker from his 
customers/victims (Lippens, 2000; 2001; Messerschmitt, 1997; Thomas, 2013). This 
delinkage allows the sociopath, in the words of Thomas’ (2013) article, ‘to hide in plain 
sight’. Lippens (2001, p.234), for example, shows how corporate crime relies on ‘flexible 
networks’ which are formed in order to be able to react quickly to ‘internal’ as well as 
‘external’ problems. In this sense, networks are not just aimed at ‘external’ threats; the 
‘outside’ is part and parcel of the ‘inside’, so that once you are in (on the secrets) you 
can never be ‘out’- the network ensures you are either in or miserable (bankrupted by 
lawsuits, shunned by friends, for example) out there!  
The recent gaze on Armstrong has shown how he built such a complex demand-and- 
supply rhizome, roping in it both regulators and collaborator. This was aimed at 
complicating detection or punishment. Bakan (2005) was already aware of this 
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detection firewall when likened ‘organized’ sociopathy to the ‘white spaces’ of late 
capitalism- the unexamined, unpoliced corporate feeding trough which only receives 
attention when something goes wrong publicly. This ‘white space’, in the case of food 
adulteration and sports doping,  is frequented and thrived on by many, despite their 
‘internal conflicts’ (as we see in the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Armstrong) because it collectively 
shields them from responsibility. Punch has characterised this ‘iron dome’ of 
responsibility as one which  
encourages covert alliances to cope with structural uncertainty, weak 
enforcement with co-opted regulators, a near collusive government engaged in 
prestigious projects and mindful of the importance of the industry for the 
national economy, etc. – made it almost rational and reasonable to break the 
law.’ (Punch, 2008, p. 104) 
Apropos of Punch, we should view this covert alliance as enabling a symbiotic 
relationship of ‘mutual protection’ between athletes, drug suppliers and sports policing 
agencies. This is more so when it comes to anti-doping agencies, such as USADA or 
WADA: Because of the asymmetry of power between big (pharmaceutical, fitness and 
advertising) business and oversight institutions, the subordinated latter is 
characterised by what Boddy (2006) refers to as ‘management failure’. This ‘failure’ 
could be read as either ‘reluctance’ but also a ‘lack of acumen’ as the case may be. As an 
example, in October 2005, in response to calls from the International Olympic Committee 
and WADA for an independent investigation, the UCI appointed Dutch lawyer Emile 
Vrijman to investigate the handling of urine tests by the French national anti-doping 
laboratory, LNDDxxvi. Vrijman's report cleared Armstrong because of improper handling 
and testing. His report said tests on urine samples were conducted improperly and fell 
so short of scientific standards that it was "completely irresponsible" to suggest they 
"constitute evidence of anything. The recommendation of the commission's report was 
no disciplinary action against any rider on the basis of LNDD research. He also called 
upon the WADA and LNDD to submit to an investigation by an outside independent 
authority. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) Ethics Commission subsequently 
censured Dick Pound, the President of WADA and a member of the IOC, for his 
statements in the media that suggested wrongdoing by Armstrong.  
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So, whether through collusion or lack of acumen (or the fact that this industry is 
characterised by a revolving door in which experts from the anti-doping agencies take 
up better paid jobs as defense for athletes they formerly targeted), the end result is 
development of a ‘white space’ of corruption/exploitation which fits the sociopath’s 
view that ‘it is fine to break the law because everyone else is doing it’. Isn’t this what 
Armstrong means when he says (on Oprah) that he saw doping as the ‘creation of a level 
playing ground’? As the typical sociopath, Armstrong deployed his ‘small army’ or 
corruptors to ‘level the playing ground’: In July 2006, for example, the Los Angeles Times 
published a story which showed how Armstrong's levels of EPO had risen and fallen 
consistent with a series of injections during the 1999 Tour De France race, but also how 
he paid experts retained by SCA Promotions to lie about the circumstances when the 
Laboratoire National de Dépistage du Dopage (LNDD) accused him of doping. Apropos of 
this revelation, Armstrong’s army of lawyers successfully sued (for breach of privacy), 
culminating in the Vrijman report, which pointed to procedural and privacy issues in 
dismissing the LNDD test results.  
On August 23, 2005, L'Équipe, a major French daily sports newspaper, reported on its 
front page under the headline "le mensonge Armstrong" ("The Armstrong Lie") that 6 
urine samples taken from the cyclist during the prologue and five stages of the 1999 
Tour de France, frozen and stored since at "Laboratoire national de Dépistage du 
Dopage de Châtenay-Malabry" (LNDD), had tested positive for erythropoietin (EPO) in 
recent retesting conducted as part of a research project into EPO testing methods. 
Armstrong immediately attacked this report, on his website, as another case of the 
‘witch hunt’ tabloid journalism’. Similarly, when the Los Angeles Times published an 
article citing information on testimony given by Armstrong's former teammate Andreu, 
and his wife Betsy, Armstrong sued the paper, but not before he got his former team 
mate, Jonathan Vaughters, to sign a statement disavowing the comments stating that he 
had ‘no personal knowledge’ that any team in the Tour de France engaged in any 
prohibited conduct whatsoever. This is but one example of a long series of denials and 
law suits against the media that Armstrong mounted up until a few months to his 
confessionxxvii. In such cases, the standard outcome was an ‘out of court settlement’ 
which allowed Armstrong to not only continue racing, but to maintain his vast stream of 
endorsement money as well as claiming the moral high ground.  For example, after the 
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Los Angeles Times case was settled out of court, Armstrong called the outcome ‘proof 
that the doping allegations were baseless’.  (In October 2012, following the publication 
of the USADA decision on doping accusations against him, SCA Promotions announced 
its intention to recoup the monies paid to Armstrong totalling in excess of $7 million. As 
fate would have it, he lost the case against the SCA in 2015 and was ordered to pay back 
$10mxxviii).  
Perhaps the biggest lesson the rhizomes of Armstrong’s doping can teach us is how the 
individual sociopath interacts with his environment. Here, the greatest danger of 
organizational sociopathy is what it does to those who do not start out as sociopaths. Of 
course not every individual involved in unethical or questionably illegal corporate 
activities is a head-hunted sociopath. Nonetheless, some more fluid personalities can be 
moulded by the container they fill, as Bakan (2005) also reminds us. In that sense, the 
container of operational sociopathy is also sometimes an amoral one: Unlike 
immorality, amoral go-getting is always not driven by a pathological desire to commit 
sadistic abuse of others (for example due to a lack of empathy), but could be due to the 
common sense desire to ‘put the food on the table’ which, depending on the 
environment, could also involve justifying means by the ends they obtain. As Zimbardo 
(2004) taught us with his ‘situationist perspective on evil’ thesis, crowd ‘excitation 
transfer’ should be reckoned with in situations of fear, anger or desire. In the meat 
industry con which we examined above, substituting beef in burgers with horsemeat 
might be a risky activity, but may also be a completely rational and ‘risk-free’ gesture 
form the perspective of collective benefit- say, when balanced against the prospect of a 
fine which could easily be offset by the sale of the corrupted meat before it is spotted 
and stopped. This is more so when the culprit has embedded their presence in the 
collective psyche, as ‘one of us’, a ‘Robin Hood’- or simply as a messiah figure like the 
Armstrong who succeeded against odds, becoming the first Texan kid to buy a private 
jet from cycling, or the larger than life Armstrong who beat cancer (an inspired 
Livestrong)xxix!  
Where does that leave us? In order to understand the motivations and protections of 
offenders, the focus should be on the organisational cultures of enterprises generally, or 
criminal ones specifically, and how these cultures appropriate life-stories to embed 
themselves onto the consumer choices.  
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‘How do you say ‘’stop doping’’ in Swahili?’ 
Since Armstrong, there has been a steady increase in revelations of doping, coming in 
the wake of revelations of sports corruption in general, and specifically the FIFA 
corruption scandal which is now under investigation by international authorities. As of 
the writing of this article, FIFA President Sepp Blatter and Uefa President Michel Platini 
have been banned for eight years from all football-related activities by Fifa's ethics 
committee, and a Swiss criminal investigation into the pair is also continuingxxx. 
Athletics has not been spared either: French prosecutors are, as of June 2016, 
investigating allegations of corruption in the bidding and voting processes for the Rio 
2016 and Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games. So far, there have been multiple arrests, 
including that of the former president of the International Association of Athletics 
Federation (IAAF), Lamine Diack, and an international arrest warrant for his son Papa 
Massata Diack, the federation’s marketing consultantxxxi. As if that is not enough, Africa’s 
athletic giant, Kenya, is involved in a standoff with WADA over allegations of systemic 
doping with the threat of being banned from Rio 2016 menacingly hanging over the 
countryxxxii. Those with intimate knowledge of the country laugh at suggestions of 
systemic state-sponsored doping. But the combination of unscrupulous agents and 
doctors and athletes hoping for a better life is dangerously potent: around 35 athletes 
have tested positive since 2012, according to the Guardian (2015)xxxiii for example. 
Systematic corruption involving officials at the highest levels of Athletics Kenya 
(federation) have been highlighted by whistle-blowers and investigative journalistsxxxiv 
for yearsxxxv, including millions of sponsorship money given by NIKE which never 
reached athletes, to allegations of trafficked athletesxxxvi.  
But this is ‘nothing’ compared to the latest allegations of organized cheating- by Russia. 
‘From Russia with Dope’ 
Allegations of cheating by Russian athletes have been common in the last few years, but 
it was a claim by a Das Erste (German TV channel) documentaryxxxvii that 99% of 
Russian athletes are involved in doping that has seized the world’s attention. The 
documentary claimed that Russian officials systematically accepted payment from 
athletes to supply banned substances and cover up tests- and that this was facilitated by 
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International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) which was bribed to turn a 
blind eyexxxviii. In the documentary, former discus thrower Yevgeniya Pecherina 
(currently serving a 10-year doping ban) claims that "most, the majority, 99%" of 
athletes selected to represent Russia used banned substances. As she claims, ‘You can 
get absolutely everything… Everything the athlete wants’. In tandem, Liliya Shobukhova, 
who won the London Marathon in 2010, also claims the Russian Athletics Federation 
accepted 450,000 euros (£350,000) of bribe money to cover up her positive doping test 
result. In the documentary an undercover video purports to show Mariya Savinova- 
who won the 800 meters gold in the 2012 Olympic games- admitting to the use of the 
steroid oxandrolone. These allegations are anything but farfetched, however: Vitaly 
Stepanov, a former Russian Anti-Doping Agency (Rusada) official, and his wife Yulia, 
formerly an 800m runner who was banned for doping, have alleged that banned 
substances were supplied by leading Russian athletics officials in exchange for 5% of an 
athlete's earnings, which involved a collusion network of the Russian statexxxix. Yulia has 
claimed that, to avoid detection, the Russian state would issue fake travel documents for 
athletes training abroad to evade out-of-competition testing. 
So, what is the point here? 
While the standard take on sociopathy emphasises how ‘one bad apple spoils the barrel’ 
(Lykken, 1996; Boddy et al. 2010)- implying that an individual sociopath can ruin the 
rest of the actors within the organisation they all operate in- we should stretch our 
purview to include the wider legitimatory network on which sociopaths derive their 
life-blood. We should, alongside Glasbeek (2002), question the received wisdom of ‘the 
rotting effect of the barrel’: is it a handful of sociopaths incapable of empathy driving the 
rest of the organisation/society to moral ruin, or does the metastasis of the sociopathy 
feed from the protective uterus of societal/industrial sociopathy? It would appear that, 
although individual sociopaths may have the inclination- and can be nurtured- they 
nonetheless need the supportive oxygen of collective societal corruption to keep 
breathing. This is the lesson apropos of Kenya and Russia, two states notorious for their 
level of public corruptionxl. That is to say, individual cheats would get nowhere unless 
there is a supportive and legitimatory framework, whether that framework relies on 
cold-pragmatics (getting ahead financially) or on nationalism (winning the medal tally). 
Braithwaite (1989) was well aware of the toxic mix of opportunity and crime, when he 
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taught us that all it takes for crime to thrive is the presence of a learning opportunity 
and blockage of a legitimate means of achievement: In both Kenya and Russia, 
systematic collapse of the economy goes hand in hand with widespread (official) 
corruption- the latter acting as a vent for the occluded space of legitimate achievement. 
But, apropos of IAAF, Rusada and so on, it is Braithwaite’s second factor- the 
embedment of ‘conditions favourable to violation of law’ -which we should not lose 
sight of: As Braithwaite argued, where penalties or sanctions do not ‘exceed prohibitory 
definitions (see also, Sutherland and Cressey, 1978) we can expect violation of norms.  
Conclusion 
This article has shown that, although doping in sports is not attributable to a single 
factor- indeed it is a complex rhizome of supply and distribution criminality- there is 
nonetheless scope to contribute to understanding sports cheating through the notion of 
sociopathy.  We have explored not only the rise and fall of individuals corresponding to 
the textbook qualities of sociopaths, in both the food industry and athletics. We have 
also taken a further step to show how the individual sociopathy develops, and inclines, 
on a network of enablers and how this enabling arrangement is itself part of a 
legitimatory framework of public expectation and attitude. The point not to be missed is 
the ordinariness of the figures we have outlined above- whether individuals, 
professions, industries or states. This is the genius of sociopathy especially the 
organizational kind: When something is repeated too often, the sublime (or active) 
repetitive gestures familiarises the thing, making it normal and defensible- especially 
where the figure involved is a cult leader, an embodiment of the collective will or 
malaise. There are no better totems than cancer survivors, national sporting heroes, 
rags-to-reaches super-achievers etc. Or, as Zizek (2015) argues, in a world where the 
neoliberal agenda actively encourages us (in advertisements and curricula) to be 
‘entrepreneurs of the self’, there is something vindicating about seeing ‘one of us’ 
succeeding against the odds, one of us ‘levelling the playing ground’. In most cases, we 
are the ‘playing ground’ which is levelled, the ‘odds’ which are beaten. 
The main achievement of this article is that, while most available literature on corporate 
sociopathy traditionally concentrate on large corporations in ‘suspect’ sectors (such as 
banking and petrochemicals) we have brought the same thinking to examination of a 
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hidden sector which feeds off public apathy and ignorance while at the same heavily 
investing in this ignorance to maintain consumption compliance. Thus, while the 
populace was enraged by the excesses which led to the collapse of the insurance and 
banking industry in 2008, entrenched sociopathy was busy, in the case of EU meat 
scandal, replacing one ruminant with another in shape of the 60% filler economy 
burgers; in the case of sports one scandal replaces another, along the daily ebb and flow 
of sponsorship money and televised gladiator contests. I mean, who wants to watch 
news bulletin on football corruption or athletics doping when you can watch records 
stumbling? 
The approach of this paper is best summed up in the words of Floyd Landis- 
Armstrong’s racing team mate and fellow cheat: ‘At the end of the day someone will 
have to look children in the eye and say that ‘’Santa Claus is not real’’’.  
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i In a televised interview with the Oprah Winfrey in January 2013, Lance Armstrong, cycling's most 
decorated champion, who was also considered one of America's greatest athletes, confessed to cheating 
for at least a decade, admitting that he owed all seven of his Tour de France titles and the millions of 
dollars in endorsements that followed to his use of illicit performance-enhancing drugs. With this gesture 
he had turned his back on years of denials and confessing that his storied career at the top of competitive 
cycling was fuelled by drugs, lies and bullying. Armstrong said it would not have been possible to win the 
titles he did without cheating, and that the cycling sport is marked by the prevalence of performance-
enhancing drugs.  
ii A major drug scandal at the 1998 Tour de France underlined the need for an independent international 
agency to set standards in anti-doping work. The World Anti-Doping Agency (Wada) was established the 
following year. 
 
iii It is important to note here that most relevant literature speak of corporate psychopaths –psychopathic 
individuals who work for corporations (Boddy 2006; 2010; Pech & Slade 2007; Akhtar et al. 2012). 
However, some speak of sociopath corporations / corporate psychopathy in reference to organizations 
(even fictional entities) with psychopathic tendencies/ symptoms (Bakan, 2005). 
iv Because of these ‘white spaces’, for example, Braithwaite (2013) claims that it is almost inevitable that a 
market driven by demand for heroes will result in adulteration to supply the ‘high’ which is the 
legitimating ‘yard stick’ of post-culture: Our emphasis, however, is that lax enforcement alone is not 
enough to account for the prevalence of food sports doping: Other factors, including deliberate 
operational cultures, must be in place to circumvent existing frameworks of regulation- precisely because 
organizational sociopathy feeds off the umbilical cord of public ignorance and/or tacit cooperation. 
v See https://www.wada-ama.org/ 
vi See, http://www.ukad.org.uk/ 
 
vii A full list of banned substances in athletics can be found on the IAAF website. 
viii See: http://www.uci.ch/ 
 
ix See also, WADA (2006) and, Yesalis (2002). 
x Erythropoietin (often shortened to EPO) is a naturally occurring hormone, secreted by the kidneys, 
whose function is to regulate red blood cell production. The use of EPO started in the 1980's as a quicker, 
cleaner alternative to blood doping. Testing for EPO only became possible in 2000, by using blood and 
urine samples, prior to this, comparisons to a 'normal level' were used to highlight a possible cheat! 
xi The video can be seen at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iu9B-ty9JCY 
 
xii See for example Patrick, Christopher (2005). Handbook of Psychopathy. Guilford Press.  
xiii See, Rutter, Steve (2007). The Psychopath: Theory, Research, and Practice. New Jersey: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates. p. 37 
xiv For a general idea of the Scandal, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_meat_adulteration_scandal 
xv Shackell (2008) defines traceability as ‘the ability to maintain a credible custody of identification 
…products through various steps within the…chain from the farm to the retailer,’ 
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xvi In the case of the Horse meat Scandal Lawrence (2013) and Kailemia (2016) single out the company 
Silvercrest (see, Guardian, 2013), linked to a horse dealer, Lawrence McAllister who in October 2012 was 
caught smuggling cannabis in a consignment of sick and wounded horses and donkeys unfit for travel, 
(Lawrence, 2013c). After the incident, investigations by the Ulster Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Animals (USPCA) revealed that the reason for MacAllister’s frequent transport of unfit horses was not to 
dispose them off but to slaughter them for sale at the Red Lion Abattoir in Nantwich, England (Lawrence, 
2013a: 27) and so forth. 
xvii See: Armstrong Kelly, Linda; Rodgers, Joni (2002). No Mountain High Enough: Raising Lance, Raising 
Me. Broadway Books. 
xviii Armstrong's total points in 1987 as an amateur were better than those of five professionals ranked 
higher than he was that year. At 16, Lance Armstrong became a professional triathlete and became 
national sprint-course triathlon champion in 1989 and 1990 at 18 and 19, respectively 
xix See: https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/mar/09/lance-armstrong-cycling-doping-scandal 
 
xx See: http://espn.go.com/sports/endurance/story/_/id/8855686/lance-armstrong-admits-doping-
interview-oprah-winfrey 
 
xxi See: http://espn.go.com/sports/endurance/story/_/id/8855686/lance-armstrong-admits-doping-
interview-oprah-winfrey 
 
xxii See: http://espn.go.com/sports/endurance/story/_/id/8855686/lance-armstrong-admits-doping-
interview-oprah-winfrey 
xxiii In June 2012, the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) accused Armstrong of doping and 
trafficking of drugs, based on blood samples from 2009 and 2010, and testimonies from witnesses 
including former teammates. Further, he was accused of putting pressure on teammates to take 
unauthorized performance-enhancing drugs as well. Armstrong was initially suspended and eventually 
banned from participating in sports sanctioned by WADA. He chose not to appeal the ban, saying it would 
not be worth the toll on his family. After years of public denials, Armstrong reversed course and admitted 
doping in an interview with Oprah Winfrey in January 2013. While admitting in the interview to the 
things he did, he also said it was "absolutely not" true that he was doping in 2009–10, and that the last 
time he "crossed the line" was in 2005. In September 2013, he was asked by UCI's new president, Brian 
Cookson, to testify completely about his doping.  
 
xxiv In June 2006, French newspaper Le Monde reported claims by Betsy and Frankie Andreu during a 
deposition that Armstrong had admitted using performance-enhancing drugs to his physician just after 
brain surgery in 1996. The Andreus' testimony was related to litigation between Armstrong and SCA 
Promotions, a Texas company attempting to withhold a $5-million bonus; this was settled out of court 
with SCA paying Armstrong and Tailwind Sports $7.5 million, to cover the $5-million bonus plus interest 
and lawyers' fees. The testimony stated "And so the doctor asked him a few questions, not many, and then 
one of the questions he asked was ... have you ever used any performance-enhancing drugs? And Lance 
said yes. And the doctor asked, what were they? And Lance said, growth hormone, cortisone, EPO, 
steroids and testosterone. Armstrong suggested Betsy Andreu may have been confused by possible 
mention of his post-operative treatment which included steroids and EPO that are taken to counteract 
wasting and red-blood-cell-destroying effects of intensive chemotherapy. 
 
xxv See, for example: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/12/sports/cycling/how-lance-armstrong-beat-
cyclings-drug-tests.html?_r=0 
 
xxvi Vrijman was head of the Dutch anti-doping agency for ten years- since then he has worked as a 
defense attorney defending high-profile athletes against doping charges. 
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xxvii See for example: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20120626051528/http://uk.eurosport.yahoo.com:80/13062012/2/state
ment-lance-armstrong.html 
 
xxviii http://www.cyclingnews.com/news/report-armstrong-pays-dollar-10-million-to-settle-sca-
litigation-case/ 
 
xxix See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Livestrong_Foundation 
 
xxxSee, for example:  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-32897066 
 
xxxi See, for example: https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2016/mar/01/french-police-corruption-
investigation-2016-2020-olympic-bids 
 
xxxii The Kenyan Olympic Committee chairman, Kipchoge Keino, has publicly warned that the World Anti-
Doping Agency was “seriously considering” banning Kenya from track and field for four years,  because of 
corruption allegations against senior figures in Athletics Kenya, and because the country has dawdled and 
delayed implementing creditable anti-doping measures. 
xxxiii https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2015/nov/17/iaaf-kenya-investigation-doping-allegations 
 
xxxivIn 2016, for example, the Sunday Times revealed that detectives were questioning three of the most 
senior officials at Athletics Kenya over claims they pocketed close to $700,000 (£460,000) from Nike: 
Isaiah Kiplagat, chairman of Athletics Kenya, the vice-president David Okeyo and Joseph Kinyua, its 
former treasurer. Okeyo, who sits on the IAAF’s 26-person ruling council, has denied the allegations.  
  
xxxv See, for example: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/06/world/africa/nike-under-scrutiny-as-
payments-for-kenya-runners-are-drained.html?_r=0 
 
xxxvi See for example, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kWRJ2w0FBPA 
xxxvii Which can be view here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iu9B-ty9JCY 
 
xxxviii The Russian Athletics Federation (RAF) says the allegations are "lies" , but both the IAAF and the 
World Anti-Doping Agency (Wada) have said they will look into the claims. The IAAF has since ‘noted a 
number of grave allegations", but also claims that ‘some of the claims were "already on-going" 
investigations. 
 
xxxix Russia, which hosted the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, and finished top of the medal table, 
currently has 67 athletes serving sanctions for doping offences, according to the latest IAAF report. In 
September 2014, Wada banned the gas xenon following allegations, in another German TV documentary, 
it had been used as a performance-enhancing substance by Russian competitors at Sochi. 
xl https://www.transparency.org/country/ 
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